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ABSTRACT
Compton, Andrew D. PhD, Purdue University, May 2019. Essays on Macroeconomics
and Labor Economics . Major Professor: Trevor S. Gallen, Victoria Prowse, John
M. Barron, and Seunghoon Na.
This paper develops a search-matching model of the labor market with part-
time employment and multiple job holdings. The model is calibrated to data from the
CPS between 2001 and 2004. Workers are able to choose their search intensity and
are allowed to hold two jobs while firms can choose what type of worker to recruit.
When compared to the canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, this model
performs quite well while capturing some empirical regularities. First, the model gen-
erates recruiting and vacancy posting rates that move in opposite directions. Second,
part-time employment is up to 10 times more responsive than full-time employment.
Third, the model suggests that multiple job holding rates are more flexible than ob-
served in the data with the rate changing by as much as 4 percentage points compared
to 0.1 percentage points in the data. Finally, the full model is able to capture compo-
sitional changes during recessions with the full-time rate declining and the part-time
rate increasing. It also produces an empirically consistent increase in the unemploy-
ment rate as well as a decrease in output. The DMP model is more muted than in
the data for both.
0.1 Introduction
Between 1996 and 2014, roughly 20% of the labor force were part-time work-
ers or worked multiple jobs.1 Faberman et al. (2017) suggest that a worker’s job
1See Appendix ??.
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prospects, search behavior, and firm recruiting differ based on the workers employ-
ment status. Further, they suggest that roughly 55% of workers would be willing to
take an additional job under the right circumstances.2 Together, these facts suggest
that modelling all jobs as full-time (FT) jobs overlooks some fundamental features of
the labor market. Overlooking part-time (PT) employment and multiple job hold-
ings (MJH) takes on greater importance given the persistently high rate of part-time
employment following the 2007-2009 recession, which has become an area of growing
interest. Valletta and van der List suggest the part-time employment rate is higher
now than in the past, even with business cycles and industry accounted for (Economic
Letters - FRBSF, 2015-19) In particular, they show that part-time employment for
economic reasons is around one percentage point higher than in the past under similar
circumstances, suggesting there may have been a structural change in the labor mar-
ket. Further, the persistently high rate of part-time employment has prompted the
Federal Open Market Committee to consider the part-time employment rate in addi-
tion to the unemployment rate when gauging the status of the labor market (FOMC
minutes from July 2016).
The goal of this paper is to explore the relationship between search frictions,
part-time employment, and multiple job holdings. Part-time employment is closely
related to multiple job holdings as search frictions can make taking a part-time job
and looking for a secondary full-time job more attractive to workers. On the other
hand, firms are also considering who they will recruit and hire and may look more
or less favorably on multiple job holders and part-time workers depending on how
difficult it is to match with a given type of worker. For instance, if firms observe
that it is difficult to match with an unemployed worker, they may be more willing
2This rate is comparable to the rate for employed workers looking for a new job and to findings from
Paxson and Sicherman (1996) who suggest that 50% of all workers will have multiple jobs at some
point in their life.
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to accept a multiple job holder. In both cases, workers and firms can use part-time
employment and multiple job holdings to smooth their expected outcomes.
To this end, I develop a model building on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
(DMP) framework, extended to allow for PT employment and MJH. In the canonical
DMP model, all jobs are assumed to be full-time and require the same skill set. In
addition, workers can only hold one job. Extensions of the DMP model have allowed
for variable productivity and skills, but there has been limited research allowing for
both variable hours and multiple job holdings. In my model, workers search for full-
time and part-time jobs simultaneously. In addition, they can hold multiple jobs.
Firms can recruit part-time and full-time workers simultaneously as well as multiple
job holders.
Separately calibrating my model to U.S. labor market data from December
2001 to December 2004 and January 2015 to December 2016, the model compares
favorably to the DMP model and a model with only multiple job holdings along shared
dimensions. Using data on job loss probabilities and the consumer Price Index for the
2007-2009 recession, the full model performs well at matching the unemployment rate
response of 1.70 pp in the data with a difference of 2.64 pp compared to a difference
of 0.2 pp in the DMP model. The results also suggest that multiple job holdings
could be more responsive than what is observed with an decrease of 4 pp in the
model compared to a decrease of 0.03 pp in the data. As suggested by Abraham et
al. (2013), multiple job holdings can be difficult to observe in the data as workers
and firms each have different incentives to report. This could be why it is difficult
to establish the relationship between economic conditions and multiple job holding
rates as the CPS may under-report or over-report depending on conditions.
Additionally, the standard DMP model is qualitatively consistent with the
relationship between the unemployment rate and the full-time employment rate (a
vnegative correlation of −0.66); however, the base model cannot say anything about
the relationship between the unemployment rate and the part-time rate (A positive
correlation of 0.51). By considering all jobs to be full-time jobs, the implications of
policy and structural changes in the standard DMP model may not be consistent with
a model that explicitly separates full-time and part-time employment. Full-time and
part-time employment can respond differently, but because the full-time employment
rate is over four times as large as the part-time employment rate, the response in
FT employment dominates. In the full model, the part-time rate is typically 10
times more responsive than the full time rate in percentage terms, and up to twice
as responsive in percentage point terms. The part-time employment rate does not
always move in the same direction as the full-time employment rate as in the case of
a change in recruiting cost. Multiple job holdings can also affect the observed part-
time rate as in the case of recessionary conditions that lead to a higher than expected
part-time rate as a result of a much lower multiple job holding rate. Altogether, this
suggests that part-time employment and multiple job holdings can have implications
for policy depending on who the policymaker cares about.
The next subsection discusses related literature followed by relevant stylized
facts from the data. In Section ??, a simple environment and equilibrium with mul-
tiple job holdings, but only one type of job, is described. Section ?? presents the
environment with both PT employment and multiple job holdings as well as the cor-
responding steady-state equilibrium. In Section ??, the model is calibrated to match
U.S. data from December 2001 to December 2005. Finally, results are presented in
Section ?? and discussed in section ??.
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0.1.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on three branches the literature. First, I consider the litera-
ture on joint-search and multiple job holdings. Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012)
construct a one-sided joint-search model of a household in which two individuals with
pooled utility and consumption search for and hold jobs simultaneously. I extend
their model to allow for firm choice regarding whether to hire a secondary worker and
household and firm choice regarding FT versus PT employment.
Zhao (2016) extends the GGV model to multiple job holders and suggests that
the opportunity to hold multiple jobs makes holding part-time work more valuable
as it provides workers with more opportunities to find full-time work and smooth
their income over states. I extend this model by introducing firms to the problem,
and discuss the role of search and recruiting behavior in this context. Since previous
work is only one sided, nothing can be said about the impact of firm-side labor market
policy on employment status, worker flows, and search behavior. I am able to evaluate
not only how policies affect workers, but also how firm choices affect workers. Firms
prove to be especially important for determining outcomes.
The second branch of the literature is on search intensity. Pissarides (2000)
provides a simple model for thinking about search intensity, but the model implies that
workers should search less when the labor market is slack. To reconcile this with the
fact that workers search harder under slack labor market conditions, Shimer (2004)
uses an urn-ball matching function to induce higher search. I extend this framework
by allowing workers to take two jobs simultaneously in a simplified framework. I also
introduce multiple matching functions depending on a worker’s current employment
status and the job they are searching for.
Finally, I consider the literature on on-the-job search. Building off of Burdett
and Mortensen’s (1998) seminal work on on-the-job search, Christensen et al. (2005),
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Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011), and Faberman et al. (2017) have introduced
variable search intensity into models of on-the-job search. As in these papers, I al-
low for on-the-job search as well as variable search effort and success depending on
a worker’s employment status. Faberman et al. is especially pertinent as they find
that employed workers differ from unemployed workers in their search behavior and
firms recruiting to them differently as well. This is in line with Davis, Faberman, and
Haltiwanger (2013) who find that firms often use informal recruiting methods when
hiring workers. I include these elements by allowing for variable search intensity and
recruiting intensity depending on a worker’s current state. I extend these models
by introducing firms which allows for endogenous wages. This generates differential
wages across employment status which supports the fact that employed workers face
a different offer distribution than unemployed workers. Finally, Gavazza, Mongey,
and Violante (2018) find that firm recruiting intensity and vacancy rate move in
opposition such that during recessions, vacancies decline while recruiting intensity in-
creases. Similar behavior occurs in the presence of multiple job holding and part-time
employment. While aggregate vacancies may decline, changes in recruiting intensity
can increase the effective vacancy rate for certain types of jobs.
0.1.2 Stylized Facts
My model targets four facts from the Survey of Consumer Expenditure (SCE)
used by Faberman et al. (2017). First, 55.5% of workers would be willing to take an
additional job and 68.4% who would be willing to take a new job. Second, full-time
workers on average have 1.18 jobs compared to 1.41 jobs for part-time workers (t =
5.1647). These two facts suggest that multiple job holdings is an option that workers
consider when making employment decisions, and that it is particularly relevant for
part-time workers. Third, workers who would be willing to take an additional job
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send out 1.13 applications per month which yield 0.5 contacts per month in addition
to 1.55 unsolicited contacts per month. This is compared to unemployed workers who
send out 6.97 applications per month and yield 0.72 contacts per month in addition
to 0.57 unsolicited contacts per month. Those seeking an additional job not only
display different job search behavior, but their success appears to be different from
unemployed workers. Firms also seek out multiple job holders more actively than they
do unemployed workers. While some of these differences are likely due to signaling
and skill, some are likely due to matching frictions. These facts reinforce the notion
that search by employed individuals is different than for unemployed individuals.
Finally, part-time workers send out twice as many job applications per month
as do full-time workers, however, the success rate for full-time workers is higher with
both receiving roughly 0.57 contacts per month. In addition, full-time workers receive
1.76 unsolicited contacts per month compared to 1.16 per month for part-time work-
ers. This suggests that part-time worker search behavior is different from full-time
worker search behavior and that the search frictions they face differ to a degree. In
the canonical DMP model, all of these workers are treated the same despite having
different search behavior and outcomes. If firms and workers are interacting differ-
ently depending on the worker’s status, then the implications of the DMP model may
miss compositional changes among the employed. To address this, my model treats
unemployed workers, full-time workers, part-time workers, and multiple job holders
differently to account for these differences.
Next, consider two stylized facts from the Current Population Survey (IPUMS-
CPS). First, I calculate monthly worker flows3 for potential workers aged 25-54 using
the CPS. The structure of the CPS shows the employment status of workers for two
four month periods, allowing for two sets of three monthly transitions. Focusing
3The method used to derive worker flows is provided in Appendix ??
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primarily on the time period from 2006 to 20124, the number of workers moving from
unemployment to part-time employment increases despite a drop in the flow rate.
Since the stock of unemployed workers is getting larger and firms and workers are
shifting their search and recruiting to part-time work, the increased stock outweighs
the lower job finding rate for workers.5 While the 2001 recession seems to generate
similar trends, the limited time frame makes it more difficult to parse from the overall
trend.
Second, there is persistence in flows to part-time for economic reasons during
the entire sample period. Flows between unemployment and part-time employment
for economic reasons increased throughout the 2000s, and peaked following the 2007-
2009 recession. While the monthly flow counts have tapered off, they are still at an
elevated level compared to the beginning of the recession. Many workers would like
full-time employment, but are unable to find anything other than part-time employ-
ment suggesting there may have been a structural shift during the 2000s as suggested
by Valletta and van der List (2015). Part-time work can be used by workers to smooth
income while they search for a full-time job. This could lead to multiple job holdings
as workers are not necessarily working the hours they desire.
Altonji and Paxson (1988) theorize workers switch jobs when faced with hourly
constraints and are more willing to accept a pay cut. An alternative theory by
Perlman (1966) and Shishko and Rostker (1976) suggests workers respond by holding
4While the NBER limits the most recent recession to 2007-2009, a wider time period captures the
entrance and exit from the trough.
5The flows between full-time and part-time employment as seen in Figure ??, are substantial month-
to-month with an average of 3.7 million workers becoming part-time and 3.8 million becoming full-
time. These transitions dwarf the other values combined. Warren (2016) provides a nice explanation
for what is happening in this case by showing that firms facing search frictions and recruiting costs
can find it optimal to switch workers between part-time and full-time rather than firing them in
response to productivity shocks. My model will not be able to account for this effect as I perform
my analysis using steady-states which do not allow for such a transition to exist endogenously in
equilibrium. While I have considered the case of variable worker-firm productivity, the problem
space becomes very intractable making it difficult to interpret.
xsecond jobs. Paxson and Sicherman (1996) find workers faced with hourly constraints
will respond by holding multiple jobs; However, the multiple job holding rate is
acyclical. This suggests that the while there may be more workers willing to work
multiple jobs, the contraction in the number of vacancies can cancel out any effect. It
also suggests that it is caused by some structural elements of the economy that should
not necessarily be overlooked, especially when looking at part-time employment.
Overall, it appears that unemployed, part-time, and full-time workers behave
differently and have different labor market outcomes. They not only search in differ-
ent ways, but they receive job offers in different ways as well suggesting firms view
each type of worker differently. To get at some of these facts, I model the search fric-
tions and trade-offs that workers and firms face when choosing search and recruiting
intensity. I allow for these choices to be made based on current status and the desired
job type. Once the equilibrium is described and the model is calibrated, I perturb
some of the structural components of the model to see how they affect part-time
employment and other labor market outcomes.
0.2 Multiple Job Holdings
In order to get a better understanding of the choices that workers are making,
I consider a simplified framework with workers who can hold two jobs simultaneously,
but there is no distinction between part-time and full-time employment. Multiple job
holdings is particularly relevant when considering part-time employment as part-time
workers are more likely to have multiple jobs and the option of additional employment
increases the flow value of being a part-time worker. An unemployed worker’s goal is
to get at least one job offer and then search for an additional job once employed.
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Environment
Consider a discrete time job search model where time goes on forever. There
is a continuum of infinitely lived, risk-neutral workers with lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtyt
where yt is the worker’s instantaneous income at time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor.
Workers can be in one of three states: unemployed, employed with one job
(primary), or employed with two jobs (primary and secondary). While unemployed
or employed in one job, workers are assumed to always be searching for a job, but can
choose the intensity with which they search. Unemployed workers can choose search
intensity s1, but they must pay weakly convex search cost σ1(s1), while workers with
one job choose their search intensity s2, but pay weakly convex search cost σ2(s2).
While unemployed, workers receive some value of leisure z1. If a worker is employed
in one job, they receive some residual value of leisure z2 as well as primary wage
w1. If a worker has two jobs, then they receive both the primary wage w1 and the
secondary wage w2, but they have no residual value of leisure. There is one type of
firm that can be in one of three states: vacant, employing one primary worker, or
employing one secondary worker. Firms can post vacancies v and choose whether to
recruit to unemployed workers (a1) or employed workers (a2 = 1 − a1) while paying
weakly convex recruiting cost C(a1, a2). Firms that hire a worker of type i ∈ {1, 2}
receive output pi and pay wage wi.
Workers and firms are matched pairwise according to two constant returns to
scale (CRTS) matching functions, one for the primary jobs and one for secondary
jobs. As before the matching function depends on the effective mass of firms (aiv)
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and the effective mass of workers (sil) where l ∈ {u, l1}. The rate at which matches
of type i ∈ {1, 2} are formed between a firm and worker is given by
mi(s¯il, aiv)
where the effective mass of workers depends on average search intensity over all
workers s¯i and li ∈ {u, l1}. As a simplification, denote average market tightness
such that mi(θ¯i) = mi(s¯il, aiv) and denote individual market tightness as mi(θi) =
mi(sil, s¯il, aiv). An unemployed worker who chooses to search with intensity s1
matches with at least one firm with probability
q1(θ1, u) =
m1(θ1)
u
upon which they can only accept one job offer. Notice that the probability of a match
depends on individual search intensity in addition to average search intensity. Similar
to unemployed workers, an employed worker who chooses to search with intensity s2
matches with at least one firm with probability
q2(θ2, l1) =
m2(θ2)
l1
which also depends on individual and average search intensity.6 The probability that
a firm fills their vacancy with a primary worker is
p1(θ¯1, v) =
m1(θ¯1)
v
which does not depend on the individual level of search intensity. Finally, the prob-
ability that a firm fills their vacancy with a secondary worker is given by
p2(θ¯2, v) =
m2(θ¯2)
v
which does not depend on individual search intensity as before.
6In equilibrium, s¯i = si and θ¯i = θi since all workers are ex-ante homogeneous.
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After a worker and firm match for a primary job, they face some risk that
the job is destroyed with probability λ1, in which case the worker transitions to
unemployment, and the firm decides whether to post a vacancy. Should they match
for a secondary job, then workers and firms face risk that the job is destroyed with
probability λ2, in which case the worker transitions to holding one job and searching
for a second, and the firm decides whether to post a vacancy. In addition, secondary
firms also have some risk of becoming a primary employer if their employees primary
job is destroyed with probability λ1. While the job destruction probability is denoted
differently for each job type, λ2 could theoretically equal λ1.
Equilibrium
At the beginning of each period, workers and firms find out if they matched.
If a an unemployed worker matches with one firm, they agree with the firm on the
primary wage. If an employed worker matches with a firm, they agree with the firm
on the secondary wage. A worker with one job receives the primary wage as well
as the residual value of leisure, and they choose their search intensity while paying
some search cost. If a worker is employed in two jobs, they receive both the primary
and secondary wage. If a worker remains unemployed, they receive the instantaneous
value of leisure and choose their search intensity while paying some search cost. If a
firm matches with a worker of type i, they receive the corresponding value of output
and pay the corresponding wage. If a firm remains vacant, they choose their recruiting
intensity and pay some recruiting cost.
xiv
Firm’s Problem
Firms start by posting a vacancy and choosing recruiting intensity a1 for un-
employed workers and recruiting intensity a2 = 1 − a1 for employed workers. Firms
choose their recruiting intensity to maximize flow value
V = max
a1
{
− C(a1, a2) + βV + βp1(θ¯1, v)[J1 − V ] + βp2(θ¯2, v)[J2 − V ]
}
(1)
where they pay recruiting cost C(a1, a2) and match with a primary worker with
probability p1(θ¯1, v) and with a secondary worker with probability p2(θ¯2, v). If they
match with a primary worker, they receive flow value
J1 = x1 − w1 + βJ1 + βλ1[V − J1] (2)
where instantaneous income is the value of output x1 and instantaneous cost is wage
w1. They also face some risk that the job is destroyed with probability λ1 in which
case they choose whether to open a vacancy. If they match with a secondary worker,
they receive flow value
J2 = x2 − w2 + βJ2 + βλ2[V − J2] + βλ1[J1 − J2] (3)
where instantaneous income is the value of output x2 and instantaneous cost is wage
w2. They also face some risk that the job is destroyed with probability λ2 in which
case they choose whether to open a vacancy. They also face some risk that their
employees primary job is destroyed with probability λ1 in which case they become
the primary employer. Because the goods market is perfectly competitive, firms
will post vacancies until the flow value of posting an additional vacancy V = 0 in
equilibrium.
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The choice of recruiting intensity for full-time workers af is given by equation
(??)
∂C
∂a1
= β
∂p1(θ¯1, v)
∂a1
J1 + β
∂p2(θ¯2, v)
∂a1
J2
where firms do not account for the effect that recruiting has on wages. As the firm
increases their recruiting intensity for unemployed workers they pay some direct cost
of recruiting denoted on the LHS. On the RHS, there are both costs and benefits.
First, there are gains to the probability that the firm matches with an unemployed
worker, but costs due to a fall in the probability of matching with an employed worker.
Worker’s Problem
Unemployed workers receive some value of leisure z1 and choose their search
intensity in order to maximize the flow value
U = max
s1
{
z1
(
1− h1(s1)
ν
)
+ β
(
U + q1(θ1, u)[E1 − U ]
)}
(4)
where they pay search cost z1h1(s1)
ν . Their choice of search intensity affects the
probability that they match with one firm for a primary job with probability q1(θ1, u).
If a worker has only one job, they choose their search intensity to maximize their flow
value
E1 = max
s1
{
w1 + z2
(
1− h2(s2)
ν
)
+ βE1 + βλ1[U − E1] + βq2(θ2, l1)[E2 − E1]
}
(5)
where wage w1 and residual value of leisure z2 is their instantaneous income. They
face some risk that the job is destroyed with probability λ1 in which case they become
unemployed, and some probability q2(θ2, s2) that they match with a secondary firm
and become a multiple job holder. If a worker has two jobs, they receive flow value
E2 = w1 + w2 + βE2 + β(λ1 + λ2)[E1 − E2] (6)
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where the wages w1 and w2 are their instantaneous income and they face some risk
of losing one job with probability (λ1+λ2) in which case they transition to single job
holding.
The choice of search intensity s1 for an unemployed worker is given by equation
(??)
z1h1(s1)
ν−1 = β
(∂q1(θ1, u)
∂s1
[E1 − U ] + q1(θ1, u)
∂[E1 − U ]
∂s1
)
(7)
where α1 = 1− β(1− λ1), α2 = 1− β(1− λ1 − λ2), α1u = α1 + β(q1(1) + q1(2)), and
α21 = α2 + βq2(1). On the LHS, workers pay some direct cost from increasing search
intensity s1 while the RHS denotes the indirect costs and benefits of increasing search
intensity. If an unemployed worker increases their search intensity, they increase the
probability of matching with any number of firms. The choice of search intensity s2
for an employed worker is given by equation (??).
z2h2(s2)
ν−1 = β
(∂q2(θ2, l1)
∂s2
[E2 − E1] + q2(θ2, l1)
∂[E2 − E1]
∂s2
− βλ1
∂[E1 − U ]
∂s2
)
(8)
The LHS contains the direct cost of increasing search intensity s2 while the RHS
contains both costs and benefits. Focusing on the RHS, the worker gains through an
increase in the probability that they match with a secondary firm.
Wage Determination
When a worker-firm match is formed, they bargain over the wage which reduces
to the axiomatic Nash Bargaining solution.7 Workers and firms have full information
7The Nash bargaining solution used here is introduced in Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1984a).
Justification for this solution is provided in Binmore, Rubinstein, & Wolinsky.
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about each other and the worker has bargaining power γ while the firm has bargaining
power 1− γ. Thus the wage for a job of type i ∈ {1, 2} is determined by
w1 = argmax(E1 − U)
γ(J1 − V )
1−γ (9)
w2 = argmax(E2 − E1)
γ(J2 − V )
1−γ (10)
which yields a system of two equations for wages w1 and w2 as in equations (??) and
(??).
w1 =
γα21x1 − (1− γ)[α21(z2 − z1 + σ1 − σ2) + βq2(θ2, l1)(w2 − z2 + σ2)]
α21
(11)
w2 =
γα1u
[
α1x2 + βλ1(x1 − w1)
]
− (1− γ)α1
[
α1u(σ2 − z2) + βλ1(w1 + z2 − z1 + σ1 − σ1)
]
α1uα1
(12)
The wage for a job of type i depends not only on the surplus generated from creating
a job of type i, but also on the surplus generated from creating a job of type −i. If x2
were to increase without a corresponding increase in x1, then w2 would increase while
w1 decreases. Similarly, if x1 were to increase, w1 would decrease while w2 decreases.
Steady-State
Definition 0.2.1 The steady-state equilibrium consists of a list (u, l1, v, a1, w1, w2,
s1, s2) that solves the unemployment flow equation
q1(θ1, u)u = λ1(l1), (13)
the single job holder employment flow equation
[
q2(θ2, l1) + λ1
]
l1 = q1(θ1, u)u+ (λ1 + λ2)l2, (14)
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the job creation condition for vacancies
C(a1, a2) = βp1(θ1, v)
(x1 − w1
α1
)
+ βp2(θ2, v)
(α1(x2 − w2) + βλ1(x1 − w1)
α1α2
)
, (15)
the firm’s recruiting intensity maximization equation (??), two wage setting conditions
(??) and (??), and the worker’s two search intensity maximization equations (??) and
(??).
When workers and firms have the option to hold multiple jobs, their choices
depend on not only on their current employment status, but also their future em-
ployment status which could include a second job. Search intensity and recruiting
intensity depend not only on the direct and indirect costs and benefits of search-
ing/recruiting for a given type of job, but also the indirect costs and benefits for the
other type of job. Even if the two types of jobs are identical in every way, the problem
does not reduce to the standard DMP model unless multiple job holdings is turned off
entirely. All together, this suggests that multiple job holdings should be considered
alongside part-time and full-time employment.
0.3 Part-Time Employment and Multiple Job Holdings
Now that I have described the multiple job holding choice, I consider the full
model with both multiple job holdings and a full-time/part-time choice. Because it
is extremely rare to go from unemployed to multiple job holdings and vice versa, I
do not allow a worker to accept more than one offer per period. This simplifies the
model and the analysis without causing major problems since the probability is so
small that excluding it will not have much effect on behavior.
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Environment
As before, consider a discrete time job search model where time goes on forever.
There is a continuum of infinitely lived, risk-neutral workers with lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtyt
where yt is the worker’s instantaneous income at time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor.
Workers can be in one of 6 states: unemployed, employed in a part-time job,
employed in a full-time job, employed in a primary part-time job and secondary full-
time job, employed in two part-time jobs, and employed in a primary full-time job
and secondary part-time job. Each worker is endowed with 240 hours of time per
month with a full-time job taking 160 hours and a part-time job taking 80 hours.8
Workers can search for a job until they have at most two jobs. There is one type
of firm that can be in one of 6 states: vacant, employing a primary, secondary,
or dual part-time worker, and employing a primary or secondary full-time worker.
Firms can only employ one worker regardless of how much time the job takes. With
endogenous wages and endogenous recruiting intensity, firms are indifferent between
hiring a worker for a full-time job or a part-time job.
Workers and firms are matched pairwise according to five CRTS matching
functions depending on the worker’s state. Vacant firms choose their recruiting in-
tensity for full-time and part-time jobs as well as for primary and secondary job
holders which effects the rate at which they match with a given type of worker. In
addition, workers can choose search intensity which effects the rate at which they
match with a firm for a given job type. Thus, the matching function depends on the
8A histogram of primary working hours shows a mass of workers at 20 hours and another at 40
hours of work per week which is equivalent 80 and 160 hours per month assuming 4 weeks in a
month. In addition, a histogram of secondary work hours shows a big mass of workers at 10 hours
and another at 20 hours. For simplicity, I ignore the 10 hour mass and focus on 20.
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effective mass of firms and the effective mass of workers. The rate at which matches
are formed between a firm and an unemployed worker in state is given by
miu(siu, s¯iu, u, as, ai, v) =
siuu(1− as)aiv
s¯iuu+ (1− as)aiv
where u is the mass of unemployed workers searching for a job of type i ∈{full-time
(f), part-time(p)}, and v is the mass of vacancies. Unemployed workers search for
full-time jobs and part-time jobs with respective search intensities sfu and spu while
firms recruit to full-time and part-time workers with respective recruiting intensities
af where ap = 1 − af . In addition, firms choose to recruit to unemployed workers
with intensity (1−as) with as being the recruiting intensity for secondary job holders.
One way to think of recruiting intensity is as the effective fraction of vacancies that
are directed toward each type of worker. The rate of matching also depends on
the average search intensity for a job of type i denoted by s¯iu.
9 The rate at which
vacancies are filled with an unemployed worker and a job of type i is given by
piu =
siuu(1− as)ai
s¯iuu+ (1− as)aiv
while the job finding rate for unemployed workers for a job of type i is given by
qiu =
siu(1− as)aiv
s¯iuu+ (1− as)aiv
.
The rate at which secondary matches for a job of type i are formed between a
firm and worker who is in state j ∈{full-time (f), part-time (p)} is given by
mij(sij, s¯ij, lj, as, ai, v) =
sijljasaiv
s¯ijlj + asaiv
9I depart from the urn-ball matching function in Section ?? as it tends to break down for extreme
differences in recruiting and search intensities. Stevens (2007) shows that while the urn-ball match-
ing function desirable properties in a discrete time framework, it does not satisfy the property that
m(0, v) = m(u, 0). As an alternative Stevens proposes the “telephone-line” matching technology
that I implement here. This technology has the added benefit of working in continuous-time.
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where lj is the mass of workers currently working a job of type j. Full-time workers
search for part-time jobs with intensity spf while part-time workers searchers for full-
time and part-time jobs with respective search intensities sfp and spp. As before, firms
recruit for full-time and part-time workers and choose secondary recruiting intensity
as. The rate at which vacancies are filled with a worker of type j and a job of type i
is given by
pij(sij, s¯ij, lj, as, ai, v) =
sijljasai
s¯ijlj + asaiv
while the job finding rate for a worker of type j for a job of type i is given by
qij(sij, s¯ij, lj, as, ai, v) =
sijasaiv
s¯ijlj + asaiv
.
Workers who choose to search with intensity sij > 0 must pay some cost defined by
the weakly convex cost function σj(sij). Firms recruiting with intensity af ∈ [0, 1]
and as ∈ [0, 1] must pay weakly convex recruiting cost C(af , as).
The matching functions exhibit two important traits for workers as they cap-
ture frictions due to congestion as well as exhibiting increasing returns to personal
search intensity. As workers increase their search intensity on average (s¯ij), the effec-
tive mass of workers searching for a job increases which results in a lower job finding
rate. On the other hand, as an individual worker increases their search intensity (sij),
they increase their personal job finding rate. In a steady-state equilibrium, individual
search intensity and average search intensity for all workers are the same.
For both workers and firms, jobs are destroyed when job specific shocks arrive
to occupied jobs at an exogenous Poisson rate depending on the type of job. Thus,
shocks arrive to primary part-time jobs at rate λp→u, secondary part-time jobs at rate
λpf→f , secondary dual part-time jobs at rate λpp→p, primary full-time jobs at rate
λf→u, and finally secondary full-time jobs at rate λpf→p. In this model, these shocks
move worker productivity from being high enough to make production profitable to
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being low enough to lead to worker-firm separation. Because the surplus generated
for each job depends on the previous state, the necessary shock required to make
a given job unproductive differs depending on the prior and current job status. In
addition to job loss, full-time workers transition to part-time work at rate λf→p while
part-time workers transition to full-time work at rate λp→f .
While unemployed, workers receive some flow value from leisure χub where b
is the base value of leisure and χu transforms b based on the current state, which in
this case is unemployment. Part-time workers receive value of leisure χpb and full-
time workers receive some value of leisure χfb, both being transformed based on the
respective state. This reflects the fact that workers have 240 hours of time per month,
but a full-time job only uses 160 and a part-time job only uses 80.
Upon being matched, each full-time firm-worker pair produces final output xf
expressed in units of utility, and each part-time firm-worker pair produces final output
xp = xf (0.5
2/3).10 Firm-worker pairs bargain over the wage that workers receive and
firms pay depending on the state that the worker is in and moving into. Firms must
also pay a full-time employment tax T when they employ a full-time worker.
Equilibrium
At the beginning of each period, workers receive their remaining value of leisure
and wages if they are employed. Firms receive the final value of output and pay
10The evidence regarding worker productivity suggest that while part-time workers tend to be paid
less than their full-time counterparts, most of this difference is due to difference in job requirements
and worker heterogeneity. There does not appear to be any sizable difference between productivity
for a part-time worker and a full-time worker who are otherwise identical. Since my model is
assuming homogeneous worker types for now, I will assume that the final value of output for a
part-time worker only differs based on the number of hours worked compared to a full-time worker.
I assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas in time spent working, so a worker who
work half as much as a full-time worker produces (0.52/3) what a full-time worker produces. The
two thirds comes from the labor share in the standard C-D function. For reference, see Aaronson
and French (2004), Hirsch (2005), Manning and Petrongolo (2008), and Ku¨nn-Nelen, de Grip, and
Fouarge (2013)
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wages. Workers then choose how intensely to search for various jobs depending on
their current state while vacant firms choose how many vacancies to post and how
intensely to recruit for part-time and full-time jobs as well as how intensely to recruit
for unemployed and employed workers. At the end of the period, some workers and
firms match at a Poisson rate and then bargain over the wage.
Firms Problem
All firms start out posting one vacancy and choosing recruiting intensity for
FT (af ) and PT (ap = 1 − af ) jobs as well as primary (1 − as) and secondary jobs
(as) while paying recruiting cost C(af , as). They receive flow value
(1− β)V = max
af ,as
{
− C(af , as) + β[pfu(Jf − V ) + pfp(Jf←p − V )]
+ β[ppu(Jp − V ) + ppp(Jp←p − V ) + ppf (Jp←f − V )]
}
(16)
and face some possibility that their FT vacancy is filled by unemployed or PT workers
at rates pfu and pfp respectively. They also face some possibility that their PT vacancy
is filled by unemployed, PT, or FT workers at rates ppu, ppp, and ppf .
If a firm matches with an unemployed FT job seeker, they receive flow value
(1− β)Jf = xf − wf←u − T + βλf→u[V − Jf ] + βλf→p[Jp − Jf ] (17)
in which case the firm receives the final value of output p, but they must pay wage
wf←u. If a firm matches with a PT worker, they receive flow value
(1− β)Jf←p = xf − wf←p − T + βλfp→p[V − Jf←p] + βλp→u[Jf − Jf←p] (18)
in which case they receive the final value of output xf , but they must pay wage wf←p.
At this point, neither firm has any open vacancies, but they face some risk of their FT
job being destroyed at rates λf→u or λfp→p respectively. In addition, a FT employer
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that matches with an unemployed worker faces some risk of the FT job becoming a
PT job at rate λf→p.
If a firm matches with an unemployed PT job seeker, they receive flow value
(1− β)Jp = xp − wp←u + βλp→u[V − Jp] + βλp→f [Jf − Jp] (19)
in which case the firm receives the final value of output 0.5p, but they must pay wage
wp←u. If a firm matches with a FT worker, they receive flow value
(1− β)Jp←p = xp − wp←p + βλpp→p[V − Jp←p] + βλp→u[Jp − Jp←p] (20)
in which case they receive the final value of output 0.5p, and they pay wage wp←f . If
a firm matches with a PT worker, they receive flow value
(1− β)Jp←f = xp − wp←f + βλfp→f [V − Jp←f ] + βλf→u[Jp − Jp←f ] (21)
in which case they receive the final value of output xp, and they pay wage wp←p.
Depending on if the firm matches with an unemployed, FT, or PT worker, the firm
faces some risk that their PT job will be destroyed at rate λp→u, λfp→f , or λpp→p
respectively. In addition, a PT employer that matches with an unemployed worker
faces some risk of the PT job becoming a FT job at rate λp→f . While it is possible
for the firm to have more than one PT worker, the model is restricted to one PT
worker as allowing for additional PT workers causes the number of states to grow
exponentially leading to the model becoming intractable. In addition, the trade-off
between FT and PT workers is my primary concern, so having additional states is
outside the realm of my analysis.
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Worker’s Problem
All unemployed workers receive some value of leisure χub where χi is the frac-
tion of the unemployed value of leisure that a worker receives when they are in state
i.11 They choose their search intensities for FT and PT jobs simultaneously while
paying cost σu(sfu, spu). While unemployed, workers receive flow value
(1− β)U = max
sfu,spu
{
χub− σu(sfu, spu) + βqfu[Ef − U ] + βqpu[Ep − U ]
}
(22)
and continue search until they receive a PT or FT job offer.
If an unemployed worker accepts a FT job, they receive flow value
(1−β)Ef = max
spf
{
wf←u+χfb−σf (spf )+βθpqp[Efp−Ef ]+βλf→p[Ep−Ef ]+βλf→u[U−Ef ]
}
(23)
and start searching for a PT job while receiving primary wage wf←u and some leftover
value of leisure χfb. In addition, they pay search cost σf (spf ). While in this state, the
worker faces some risk of losing their FT job at Poisson rate λf→u or having their FT
job become a PT job at rate λf→p. Upon accepting a secondary PT job in addition
to their FT job, the worker receives flow value
(1− β)Efp = wf←u + wp←f + βλfp→f [Ef − Efp] + βλf→u[Ep − Efp] (24)
wherein they receive primary FT wage wf←u and secondary PT wage wp←f . Since
they no longer have any unused time, they receive no value of leisure and do not
search for any jobs. They also face risk of losing their FT job at rate λf→u and their
PT job at rate λfp→f .
Should an unemployed worker accept a PT job, they receive flow value
(1− β)Ep = max
sfp,spp
{
wp←u + χpb− σp(sfp, spp) + βqfp[Epf − Ep] + βqpp[Epp − Ep]
11I assume that χpp = χf since a workers with two part-time jobs and full-time workers both work
40 hours per week.
xxvi
+ βλp→f [Ef − Ep] + βλp→u[U − Ep]
}
(25)
while searching for both a PT and a FT job simultaneously. They receive pri-
mary wage wp←u and some leftover value of leisure χp(b) while paying search cost
σp(sfp, spp). While in this state, they face some risk that they lose their primary PT
job at rate λp→u and some risk that their PT job becomes a FT job at rate λp→f .
Upon accepting a secondary FT job in addition to their PT job, the worker receives
flow value
(1− β)Epf = wf←p + wp←u + βλp→u[Ef − Epf ] + βλfp→p[Ep − Epf ] (26)
wherein they receive primary PT wage wp←u and secondary FT wage wf←p. Since
they no longer have any unused time, they receive no value of leisure and do not
search for any jobs. They also face risk of losing their FT job at rate λfp→p and their
PT job at rate λp→u. Upon accepting a dual PT job in addition to their primary PT
job, the worker receives flow value
(1− β)Epp = wp←u + wp←p + χppb+ β(λp→u + λpp→p)[Ep − Epp] (27)
wherein they receive primary PT wage wp←u and dual PT wage wf←p. They also
receive leftover value of leisure χppb. Finally, they face some risk of losing their
primary PT job at rate λp→u and their dual PT job at rate λpp→p. At this point,
they do not search for any additional jobs. While it is possible for workers in the real
world to hold more than two jobs, this restriction matches well with the data.12
12Averett (2001) finds that moonlighting men tend to hold one full-time job and one part-time job
while women tend to hold two part-time jobs. Similarly, Hipple (2010) finds that 92% of multiple
job holders only hold two jobs.
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Job Creation Condition
The number of vacancies in equilibrium is determined endogenously by the
job creation condition. First, set the flow value of posting a vacancy V = 0. The
number of vacancies in the market is endogenous and depends on each firms profit
maximization. As such, profit maximization implies that the value of one more va-
cancy is zero as positive value would result in an additional vacancy. This zero profit
condition arises from the goods market being perfectly competitive. Thus, the flow
value of posting a vacancy is V = 0. This allows for solving equations (??)-(??) for
the flow values themselves. Plugging these equations into equation (??) gives the job
creation condition
C(af , as) = β
(
pfuJf + pfpJf←p + ppuJp + pppJp←p + ppfJp←f
)
(28)
which defines the firms choice to post a vacancy.
Wage Determination
When a worker-firm match is formed, they engage in an alternative offers bar-
gaining game, which reduces to the axiomatic Nash Bargaining solution, to determine
each wage. The worker of type j ∈ {u, f, p} and the firm have full information about
each other such that they bargain over the total surplus generated by the match for
a job of type i ∈ {f, p}. Thus, each wage wi←j is determined by equations (??) if the
worker is unemployed and (??) if the worker is employed.
wi←u = argmax (Ei − U)
γi(Ji − V )
1−γi (29)
wi←j = argmax (Eji − Ej)
γi(Ji←j − V )
1−γi (30)
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Optimal Search and Recruiting Intensity
Workers choose their search intensity optimally to maximize the flow value of
their current state. Workers do not internalize the impact their search intensity will
have on wages. Each worker chooses their search intensity until the marginal cost of
search is equivalent to the marginal benefit which comes from changes in matching
rates and the value of future states.
0 =
∂σu
∂sui
+ β
∂qiu
∂siu
[Ei − U ] + βqiu
∂[Ei − U ]
∂siu
+ βq−iu
∂[E−i − U ]
∂siu
∀ i ∈ {f, p} (31)
0 =
∂σj
∂sij
+ β
∂qij
∂sij
[Eji − Ej] + β
∑
i
qij
∂[Eji − Ej]
∂sij
− βλju
∂[Ej − U ]
∂sij
− βλj,−j
∂[E−j − Ej]
∂sij
∀ (i, j) ∈ {(f, p), (p, f), (p, p)} (32)
Equations (??) and (??) respectively define the optimal search intensity sfu
for an unemployed worker searching for a FT job, the optimal search intensity spu for
an unemployed worker searching for a PT job, the optimal search intensity spf for a
single FT job holder searching for a PT job, the optimal search intensity sfp for a
single PT job holder searching for a FT job, and the optimal search intensity spp for
a single PT job holder searching for a secondary PT job.
∂Cv(af , as)
∂af
= β
∑
i
∑
j
∂pij
af
Jij ∀(i, j) ∈ {(f, u), (p, u), (p, f), (f, p), (p, p)} (33)
∂Cv(af , as)
∂as
= β
∑
i
∑
j
∂pij
as
Jij ∀(i, j) ∈ {(f, u), (p, u), (p, f), (f, p), (p, p)} (34)
Similar to workers, firms choose their recruiting intensities af and as optimally
to maximize the flow value of their current state. As with workers, firms do not
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internalize the impact that their decisions will have on market conditions such that
they take wages as a given. Equation (??) defines the optimal recruiting intensity
(af ) for a firm recruiting for a full-time worker. This implicitly defines the recruiting
intensity (ap = 1− af ) for a firm searching for a full-time worker. Similarly, equation
(??) defines the optimal recruiting intensity (as) for firms that want to hire a worker
who already has a primary job. Again, this implicitly defines the recruiting intensity
(1− as) for a firm looking to hire an unemployed worker. In both cases, firms adjust
their recruiting intensity until the marginal cost of recruiting intensity is equivalent
to the marginal benefit which come from changes in the vacancy filling rates and the
cost of recruiting.
Worker Flows
In the steady-state, the mean rate of unemployment, single FT, single PT,
primary FT and secondary PT, primary PT and secondary FT, and dual PT job
holdings should be constant. In a given time interval without growth or turnover
in the labor force, the mean number of workers who enter into unemployment is
[λp→ulp + λf→ulf ]Ldt where lf is the rate of single FT job holdings, and lp is the
rate of single PT job holdings. During the same time interval, the mean number of
workers moving out of unemployment is [qfu+ qpu]uLdt where u is the unemployment
rate. In the steady state, the evolution of the mean rate of unemployment as
u˙ = λp→ulp + λf→ulp − [qfu + qpu]u
which can be rewritten to define the unemployment rate as in equation (??).
λp→ulp + λf→ulf = [qfu + qpu]u (35)
Over the same time interaval, flows into single PT job holdings (lp) is
[qpuu+ (λp→u + λpp→p)lpp]Ldt+ λf→ulfpLdt+ λfp→plpfLdt+ λf→plfLdt
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where lpp is the rate of dual PT job holdings, lfp is the rate of primary FT and
secondary PT job holdings, and lpf is the rate of primary PT and secondary FT job
holdings. By assuming that all employment rates must sum to one, lpf = 1−u− lf −
lp− lpp− lfp. Outflows are [qfp+ qpp+λp→u+λp→f ]lpLdt. In the steady state, we can
write the evolution of the mean rate of single PT job holdings as
l˙p = qpuu+ (λp→u + λpp→p)lpp + λf→ulfp + λfp→plpf + λf→plf
− [qfp + qpp + λp→u + λp→f ]lp
which can be rewritten to define the rate of single PT job holdings as in equation
(??).
qpuu+(λp→u+λpp→p)lpp+λf→ulfp+λfp→plpf+λf→plf = [qfp+qpp+λp→u+λp→f ]lp (36)
Similarly, the for single FT job holdings, dual PT job holdings, and primary
FT and secondary PT job holdings are
qfuu− qpf lf + λfp→f lfp + λp→ulpf + λp→f lp = λf→ulf + λf→plf , (37)
qpplp = (λp→u + λpp→p)lpp, (38)
and
qpf lf = (λf→u + λfp→f )lfp, (39)
respectively.
Steady-State
Definition 0.3.1 The steady-state equilibrium consists of a vector (u, lp, lf , lfp, lpp,
v, af , as, wf←u, wf←p, wp←u, wp←f , wp←p, sfu, spu, spf , sfp, and spp) that solves the
unemployment flow equation (??), part-time single job holdings flow equation (??),
full-time single job holdings flow equation (??), the part-time dual job holdings flow
equation (??), the primary full and secondary part-time job holdings flow equation
(??), the job creation condition for vacancies (??), the firm’s recruiting intensity
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maximization equations (??) and (??), five wage setting conditions (??) and (??),
and the worker’s five search intensity maximization equations (??) and (??).
0.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match monthly data from the U.S. from December
2001 to December 2004. This time frame serves as a baseline which can be perturbed
to analyze the effects of recessions. All fixed parameters are summarized in Table ??.
First, the job destruction rates λf→u−λfp→f are set according to HP filtered monthly
data on workers employment status from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The
design of the CPS allows one to distinguish how many jobs an individual has and
whether they are full-time or part-time jobs. Since workers can be observed for two
sets of four consecutive months, there are 6 observations per worker for flows between
different states. Aggregating up, the average primary full-time rate λf→u = 0.023, sec-
ondary full-time rate λfp→p = 0.037, primary part-time rate λp→u = 0.046, secondary
dual part-time rate λpp→p = 0.156, and the secondary part-time rate λfp→f = 0.191.
13
The value of leisure χib is χub = b which serves as the based value of leisure.
Using annual data from the 2003-2015 American Time Use Survey (ATUS), I calculate
the average amount of time an individual has for leisure based on whether they are
unemployed, part-time, full-time, or working multiple jobs. The data suggests that
part-time workers have 29.36% as much time for leisure as unemployed workers while
full-time workers have 5.4% as much leisure as unemployed workers. Thus, the value
of leisure for part-time workers χpb and χfb are set equal to 29.36% and 5.4% of the
value of leisure b for unemployed workers respectively. The final value of output for
full-time workers xf = 1 is chosen as the numeraire. The final value of output for part-
time workers is calculated based on a Cobb-Douglas production function that depends
13The derivation method is outlined in Appendix ??.
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on hours worked and a labor share of 2/3. The discount rate β = (1 − r) = 0.9959
is set according to a real annual interest rate of 5 percent. The full-time employment
tax T = 0 is set as a baseline which can be perturbed. The worker’s share of the
surplus generated from a match γf = γp = 0.5 are set in order to satisfy the Hosios
condition.
All jointly calibrated parameters are summarized in Table ?? following a
monthly frequency. Workers receive some value of leisure b = 0.9668 which is cali-
brated so the ratio of effective vacancies to the aggregate unemployment level is 0.44
to match the CPS and JOLTS data. The total cost of recruiting intensities af and
as is
C(af , as) = c(1− as)(af + ap) + Cas(af + ap)
where c is the marginal cost of posting an additional vacancy to unemployed workers
and C is the marginal cost of posting to employed workers. Since there is no concrete
evidence to suggest that recruiting for part-time workers is more costly that recruiting
for full-time workers, the recruiting cost is the same for both types, but I assume that
recruiting costs for employed and unemployed workers differ as the methods of contact
can differ. The cost parameter c = 0.3418 is calibrated based on data summarized
in Silva & Toledo (2009) which suggests that the average cost of recruiting for and
hiring a new employee is roughly 30.23% of the worker’s output. The cost parameter
C = 0.2929 is calibrated with the search cost parameters in order to match matching
probabilities for workers.
The total cost of search intensity while unemployed, employed full-time, and
employed part-time are
σu(sfu, spu) = χub(1− hfsfu − hpspu)
σf (spf ) = χfb(1−Hfhpspf )
σp(sfp, spp) = χpb(1−Hphfsfp −Hphpspp)
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where hf is the cost of search for a full-time job and hp is the cost of searching for a
part-time job. While employed in a full-time or part-time job, these cost parameters
are transformed by Hf and Hp to reflect additional constraints on an individuals
ability to find a job while working as well as reflecting an aversion to holding a
second job. Combined, with the cost parameter C, these values are calibrated to
match the average job finding probabilities for a worker of type i ∈ {u, f, p} finding a
job of type j ∈ {f, p} which are estimated using monthly CPS data from December
2001 to December 2004.14
0.5 Results
Calibrating the baseline model to the data as outlined in the previous section
generates the results displayed in Table ??. The rate of unemployment and each
employment rate are all within a reasonable distance of the actual observed values.
The first thing that stands out in Table ?? is that workers search more intensely for
part-time jobs than full-time jobs with search intensity spu > sfu and spp > sfp. This
is primarily because firms recruit more intensely for full-time workers with af = 0.6761
being twice as large as recruiting intensity for part-time workers. Because af is so
high, there is a lower incentive for workers to search for a full-time job compared to
a part-time job.
The wage for primary part-time jobs is greater than part-time worker pro-
ductivity. This result likely stems from the probability that the job could become a
full-time job at some point. In addition, for firms, they are willing to take on the
loss because they can avoid paying the cost of posting and maintaining a vacancy in
addition to perhaps ending up with a full-time worker. In an attempt to mitigate
14Using the same method used for estimating job loss probabilities. The derivation method is
outlined in Appendix ??.
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this result, the leisure values of being employed χf and χp were calibrated in lieu of
the cost parameters Hf and Hp, but this did not affect the results as they function
in similar ways in equilibrium. Since Hf and Hp function as disutility parameters for
search, I opted to stick with this calibration strategy.
Comparing Models
One of the purposes of this paper is to examine how well a model of part-time
employment and multiple job holdings compares to the standard Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides model. Given shocks to the final value of output, the cost of search, and
the cost of recruiting, the full model compares favorably to the DMP model while
also showing changes in employment composition. In addition, turning off part-time
employment and focusing on MJH compares favorably as well. In the tables below,
each exogenous parameter is perturbed for the DMP model, the model with MJH,
and the model with both PT employment and MJH. Finally, I compare how the
models perform when parameters are set according to their levels during the 2007-
2009 recession.
First, the final value of output is perturbed as in Table ??. For the models
with MJH and the full model, all final values of output are perturbed by the same
percentage. In all cases, the unemployment rate decreases as the final value of output
increases by 1%. Focusing on the models with the baseline value of leisure, the DMP
model and full model compare very favorably with the decreases in the unemployment
rate being almost identical at 59.81% and 58.73% respectively. Of interest is the
changing composition of part-time employment and full-time employment. In the
DMP model, employment increases by 5.27%, but FT employment rate increases by
2.64% in the full model. Making up the rest of the gap between the two models, the
PT employment rate increases by 18.65%. Given how well the two models compare
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in employment, they do not compare well for the vacancy rate. As the final value of
output increases, the vacancy rate drops in the full model compared to an increase
in the DMP model. This is because firms are shifting their recruiting behavior from
secondary workers to primary workers in the full model.
The same set of comparative statics are performed with the baseline value
of leisure reduced by 1% as in the second set of columns in Table ??. Given a
lower value of leisure, the full model becomes more responsive to a shock to the final
value of output while the DMP and MJH models are less responsive. For instance,
the unemployment rate response drops from 59.81% to 36.43% for the DMP model
while it increases from 58.73% to 99.01% in the full model. In addition, the PT
rate increases by 22.3% compared to a 18.65% increase in the baseline full model.
On the other hand, the FT rate and vacancy rate responses becomes smaller for all
the models. This suggest that part-time employment plays an important role as a
means of smoothing income and employment for workers and firms when they have
the ability to change their search and recruiting behaviors.
Next, I examine an increase in the cost of search in Table ??. For the DMP
model, there is only one search cost while the MJH and full models have more than
one search cost which are increased by the same percentage. The results are quite
different for the three models. In the full model, an increase in the cost of search leads
to a large increase in search for part-time employment which results in an increase in
employment and a decrease in the unemployment rate. These stark differences harken
back to the comparative statics for the cost of full-time and part-time search in the
previous section. For an increase in the cost of full-time search, the comparative
statics look similar to the results for the DMP and MJH models, but a proportional
increase in the cost of part-time search dominates this effect and results in lower
unemployment and higher employment rates, especially for part-time employment.
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Looking again at the case of a lower value of leisure, the unemployment rate and
part-time rate are more responsive in the full model compared to the DMP and MJH
models while the full-time rate and vacancy rate are less responsive. This result is
qualitatively consistent with the results from the case of a shock to the final value of
output.
Now, consider an increase in the cost of recruiting for all types of workers in
Table ??. As in the case of an increase in the cost of search, the DMP model differs
from the full model, but, unlike previously, the MJH model compares favorably. In-
creasing recruiting cost leads to lower vacancy rates across the board as it becomes
more costly for the firm to post a vacancy. This leads to an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate in the DMP and MJH model. On the other hand, an increase in the cost of
recruiting leads to firms shifting towards posting secondary vacancies and part-time
vacancies which results in a higher part-time rate. In turn, this leads to an decrease
in the unemployment rate. In the absence of part-time employment, the DMP and
MJH models behave similarly.
Finally, I compare how the models perform when there is a recessionary shock.
To accomplish this, I set parameters according to their levels during the 2007-2009
recession as in Table ??. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the
largest drop in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was from September 2008 to Decem-
ber 2008 when prices fell by 3.34%. Thus, I decrease the final values of output xf and
xp by 3.34%. In addition, each job destruction and transition rate is set according to
the average value from the CPS. Comparing the steady-state values for each set of
parameters should be sufficient as there are few dynamic elements in these models.
Nash Bargaining will result in the model moving to the new steady-state very quickly
if dynamics were introduced.
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The results in Table ?? suggest that the full model has some advantages over
the DMP model. The full model does well at matching the responses in the unem-
ployment rate, full-time rate, and part-time rate, especially their values at the trough
of the recession. Unfortunately, the response in the MJH rate was too strong with the
MJH dropping to 0.12% as opposed to the lowest rate observed in the data at 5.29%.
The DMP model produces relatively muted respones with the unemployment rate
jumping from 8.1% to 8.3% which is below both the average and the trough values
in the data. In addition, the decline in real GDP is only 0.22% which is far below
the average and trough values from the Bureau of Economic Analysis at -1.69 and
-3.98 respectively. The full model does provide a stronger response in real GDP with
a decline of 6.8%. This is largely a result of the strong decline in the multiple job
holding rate. Overall, the full model captures compositional changes among employed
workers which are not captured by the DMP model.
0.6 Discussion
The primary objective of this paper was to understand how workers and firms
interact in a market with multiple job holdings. The second objective was to see how
they might behave differently than in the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
model with only one job. First, consider how firms respond to changes in produc-
tivity. As the final value of output increases, firms create fewer vacancies, but due
to shifting recruiting behavior, the effective vacancy rate for unemployed workers
is actually higher while the effective vacancy rate is lower for workers who already
have a job. Compare this with the conclusion by Gavazza, Mongey and Violante
(2018) who suggest that vacancies and recruiting behavior are often working in dif-
ferent directions, especially during recessions. One major difference is that in the
model presented here, recruiting behavior also takes into account multiple job hold-
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ers whereas GMV does not. In addition, the ability of firms to hire part time workers
becomes important as well when considering shocks to the cost of recruiting. When
recruiting becomes more expensive, firms shift towards less costly recruitment of al-
ready employed workers as well as workers searching for part-time jobs. This can
actually lead to a 16% lower unemployment rate, but also a 17% higher part-time
rate such that workers may be worse off on average. These results suggest that the
ability to shift recruitment from primary to secondary and full-time to part-time play
an important role in firm responses. In their absence, firms become less responsive
and act in opposite ways.
Common in the empirical literature is the notion that some workers take part-
time jobs as a means of smoothing their income, especially during recessions when
the rate of workers who are part-time for economic reasons increases. This general
idea seems to hold. For instance, decreasing the value of leisure results in a lower
unemployment rate and higher full-time and part-time rates, however, the part-time
rate increases by 20% compared to a 2.5% increase in the full-time rate. This corre-
sponds to the part-time rate increasing by roughly 3 percentage points compared to
full-time’s 2 pp increase. This corroborates the notion that part-time employment is
an important margin for adjustment as unemployment becomes less valuable. In ad-
dition, as the value of leisure falls, unemployment and part-time employment become
much more responsive to shocks as seen with increasing search cost, recruiting cost,
and final value of output. In particular, the part-time employment response increases
while the full-time rate decreases further supporting the use of part-time employment
as a means of smoothing ones utility.
Overall, the model presented here performs relatively well compared to the
DMP model when introducing recessionary shocks. In this case, plugging in data
from the 2007-2009 recession generates a large increase in the unemployment rate
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from 7.6% to 10.24% compared with the DMP models increase from 8.1 - 8.3%. The
average and trough value for the unemployment rate are 8.84% and 9.3% respectively.
The full model also produces a sharp decline in the full-time employment rate from
75.8% to 70.5% compared to the data suggesting a rate of 69.0% on average. In
addition, the part-time employment rate jumps from 16.6% to 19.2% which is in line
with the observed increase to 17.0% in the data. Most of the overshooting in the
part-time rate is due to the larger than expected decline in the multiple job holding
rate.
One possible reason why multiple job holdings may not be responsive in the
data is due to reporting problems. Discussing the stark difference between household
and establishment level employment data, Abraham et al. (2013) conclude that
multiple job holdings is likely under-reported during recessions, but it is possible
that the effect could be in the opposite direction as there are competing incentives
for firms to not report workers and workers to not report income. These incentives
change depending on market conditions and are mostly related to shielding wages
from taxes. In this light, my model produces an unlikely decline in the multiple job
holdings rate, but it suggests that the rate may decline contrary to the conclusions
of Hirsh, Husain, & Winters (2016). Given the shortcomings of the data on multiple
job holdings, it may be hard to distinguish which is the correct conclusion.
0.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I start by documenting several facts regarding part-time em-
ployment and multiple job holdings. Data from the Survey of Consumer Expenditure
suggests that a worker’s search behavior and job offers depend on their current em-
ployment status. In addition, multiple job holdings appears to be more important
for part-time workers as they are more willing to work multiple jobs than are full-
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time workers. To this end, I construct a search theoretic model that includes both
part-time employment and multiple job holdings in addition to full-time employment.
I allow for firms to recruit to different types of workers in different ways and I al-
low workers to choose their search intensity depending on their current employment
status.
Allowing for part-time work and multiple job holdings in the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides model generates some novel results. First, variable recruiting results in
the vacancy rate responding to shocks in the opposite direction of the DMP model.
Despite this, the effective vacancy rate for a given job can still move in the same
direction. Second, when comparing the full model to the DMP model, a recessionary
shock in the full model produces results that are more in line with the data. This
includes a larger jump in the unemployment rate and output as well as capturing the
compositional changes within the employment rate. Finally, multiple job holdings are
important when part-time employment is included. The model suggest that multiple
job holding rates can vary quite dramatically and this drives some of the response in
the part-time employment rate. The model presented here provides a way of looking
behind the veil to see how firms and workers are responding. Given the importance of
multiple job holdings in this model, future work should consider how firm size effects
part-time employment and multiple job holdings.
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Figure 1.: Non-Recession Worker Flows (25-54 Age Group)
Average calculated using HP-filtered monthly CPS data from December 2001 to December
2004. HP filtered data is used to remain consistent with Figure ??. Numbers inside circle
represent average monthly count in millions. Percentages above/below arrows represent
average monthly probability of moving from one employment status to another. Finally,
number in parentheses above/below arrows represent average monthly count of workers
transitioning from one employment status to another.
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Figure 2.: Firm Flows
Figure ?? shows the different types of workers a firm could have as well as how their
relationship with their worker could evolve. From the firms perspective, their pairing could
be destroyed, or their worker’s other pairing could be destroyed.
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Figure 3.: Worker Flows
Figure ?? shows the different states a worker could be in as well as how their current state
could evolve through getting a new job or having one of their jobs destroyed.
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Table 1.: Independently Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target/Source
λf→u 0.023 CPS probability of losing primary FT job = 0.023
λfp→p 0.037 CPS probability of losing secondary FT job = 0.037
λp→u 0.046 CPS probability of losing primary PT job = 0.046
λpp→p 0.156 CPS probability of losing secondary dual PT job = 0.156
λfp→f 0.191 CPS probability of losing secondary PT job = 0.191
χu 1 Base value of leisure
χp 0.2936 % of unemployed leisure time for PT worker from ATUS
χf 0.0540 % of unemployed leisure time for FT worker from ATUS
xf 1 xf = (1
2/3)
xp 0.63 xp = (0.5
2/3)
r = (1− β) 0.00407 Annual interest rate 5%
T 0 Baseline
γf 0.5 Hosios Condition
γp 0.5 Hosios Condition
Table 2.: Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Targets
hf 0.0432 Probability of finding primary FT job qfu = 0.205
hp 0.0040 Probability of finding primary PT job qpu = 0.091
Hf 7784 Probability of finding secondary PT job qfp = 0.009
Hp 1347 Probability of finding secondary dual PT job qpp = 0.006
C 0.2929 Probability of finding secondary FT job qpf = 0.009
c 0.3418 Total cost of recruiting = 0.3203 (Silva & Toledo (2009))
b 0.9668 Ratio of effective vacancies to unemployed asv/u = 0.44
All Targets matched with sum of squared errors < 10−10
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Table 3.: Baseline Results
Variable Baseline Data Variable Baseline wj←i/wf←u
Unemployment Rate u 0.0804 0.0764 Primary FT wage wf←u 0.9434 1
FT Rate lf 0.7151 0.7074 Primary PT wage wp←u 0.7796 0.8264
PT Rate lp 0.1594 0.1597 Secondary PT wage wp←f 0.3243 0.3438
FT/PT Rate lfp 0.0289 0.0473 Secondary FT wage wf←p 0.5984 0.6343
PT/PT Rate lpp 0.0126 0.0079 Dual PT wage wp←p 0.3923 0.4158
Variable Baseline sji/sfu Variable Baseline
U search for FT sfu 0.4454 1 Vacancy Rate v 0.0805
U search for FT spu 0.1817 0.4079 FT Recruiting af 0.6761
FT search for PT spf 0.0099 0.0222 Primary Recruiting as 0.4393
PT search for FT sfp 0.0065 0.0146
PT search for PT spp 0.0205 0.0460
Table ?? shows the steady-state results for the calibrated model. To put the wage in
perspective, I divide each by the primary FT wage to get wj←i/wf←u. Similarly, I divide
each search intensity by the search intensity for a primary FT job to get sji/sfu.
Table 4.: 1% increase in final value of output
Baseline Value 99% Baseline Value
of Leisure of Leisure
DMP MJH Full DMP MJH Full
%∆ Unemp. Rate -59.81 -45.34 -58.73 -36.43 -35.61 -99.01
%∆ FT Rate 5.27 4.00 2.64 1.23 1.66 -0.39
%∆ PT Rate - - 18.65 - - 22.30
%∆ MJH Rate - 167.46 -99.83 - 61.37 -37.85e3
%∆ Vacancy Rate 63.86 97.08 -41.35 35.75 50.52 -37.09
Table 5.: 1% increase in cost of search
Baseline Value 99% Baseline Value
of Leisure of Leisure
DMP MJH Full DMP MJH Full
%∆ Unemp. Rate 1.39 -0.45 -16.18 1.09 1.20 -29.12
%∆ FT Rate -0.12 0.04 0.23 0.04 -0.06 -0.10
%∆ PT Rate - - 17.07 - - 19.11
%∆ MJH Rate - -15.86 -14.77 - -10.28 -95.99
%∆ Vacancy Rate -0.25 -6.12 -12.23 -0.08 -5.79 -10.66
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Table 6.: 1% increase in cost of recruiting
Baseline Value 99% Baseline Value
of Leisure of Leisure
DMP MJH Full DMP MJH Full
%∆ Unemp. Rate 2.27 0.56 -2.45 -2.00 -2.26 32.11
%∆ FT Rate -0.20 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.11 -0.47
%∆ PT Rate - - 16.16 - - 16.80
%∆ MJH Rate - -6.12 -1.83 - 9.17 -0.41
%∆ Vacancy Rate -1.40 -3.42 -3.09 0.07 4.62 6.39
Table 7.: Parameters
Parameter 12/2001-12/2004 12/2007-6/2009
xf 1 0.966
xp 0.63 0.603
λf→p 0.057 0.059
λp→f 0.255 0.244
λf→u 0.023 0.022
λpf→p 0.037 0.035
λp→u 0.046 0.045
λpp→p 0.156 0.156
λfp→f 0.191 0.177
Table 8.: Results for Recessionary Shock
Baseline∗ 2007-2009)
DMP Full Data DMP Full Data Trough
Unemployment
Rate
0.0810 0.0760 0.0764 0.0830 0.1024 0.0884 0.0930
FT Rate 0.9190 0.7579 0.7639 0.9170 0.7053 0.6902 0.6839
PT Rate - 0.1661 0.1597 - 0.1923 0.1676 0.1702
MJH Rate - 0.0407 0.0565 - 0.0012 0.0538 0.0529
%∆ RGDP - - - -0.220 -6.776 -1.689 -3.983
∗ Baseline corresponds to Dec. 2001 - Dec. 2004
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1A. Worker Flow Derivation
Worker flows were calculated using the Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS).
Starting in 1994, the CPS started asking questions regarding multiple job holdings.
In particular, they started asking individuals if they worked more than one job in
the prior week, and if so, how many. The survey also asks about an individuals work
history. Particularly useful for me, they ask whether the individual is unemployed,
part-time or full-time for economic or non-economic reasons, or if they are not part
of the labor force. Combining these questions gives me a reasonable way to measure
the fraction of workers in each employment state and the transitions between.
The data is not without shortcomings though. Data from 1995 showed much
more fluctuation in the number of individuals in each sample month, so I have elected
to drop the years 1994 and 1995.1 In addition, I have elected to keep only those
individuals between the ages of 25 and 54.2 This way I can minimize transitions from
being in school to working and from working into early retirement. Thus, my sample
consists of all individuals between the ages of 25 and 54 who were sampled between
January 1996 and December 2014
Once I have calculated the weighted sums of individuals in each state and
moving between each state, I can calculate the probability of a worker moving from
one state to another. This probability is denoted by
ft,i→j =
Mt,i→j
Mt−1,i
1Individuals are surveyed for 4 months, then ignored for 8 months, and re-surveyed for 4 months.
Sample months are labeled 1-8 to represent the 8 total months that individuals get sampled
2Similar to Shimer (2012)
2where t is the current time period, t− 1 is the previous time period, i is the previous
state of employment, j is the current state of employment, and M is the mass of
workers in a given state. Once I have this probability, I can back out the Poisson rate
using the equation Pr(X < x) = ft,i→j = 1− e
−λt,i→jx. Setting x = 1, I can solve for
the Poisson arrival rate
λt,i→j = −ln(1− ft,i→j)
Once these rates are calculated, I apply a HP filter to the data in order to extract
the underlying trend.
3B. Part-Time and Full-Time Employment
In order to get a better understanding of the choices that workers are making, I
consider a simplified framework with workers and firms restricted to either one part-
time job or one full-time job. The worker’s goal is to receive a job offer for either a
part-time or full-time job, but receiving more than one job offer is no more valuable
than receiving only one.
B.1 Environment
Consider a discrete time job search model where time goes on forever. There
is a continuum of infinitely lived, risk-neutral workers with lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtyt
where yt is the worker’s instantaneous income at time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor.
Workers can be in one of 3 states: unemployed, employed part-time, or em-
ployed full-time. Each worker is endowed with 40 hours of time with a part-time job
requiring 20 hours and a full-time job requiring 40 hours. While unemployed, workers
are assumed to always be searching for a job, but can choose the intensity with which
they search for part-time work (sp) or full-time work (sf ), however, they must pay
weakly convex search cost σ(sp, sf ). Search intensity can be thought of as some mea-
sure of the number of applications a worker sends out as well as the quality of each
application such that search intensity {sf , sp} ∈ R. Searching with intensity si = 0 is
4equivalent to not searching at all. Unemployed workers receive value of leisure z while
employed workers receive wage wi with i ∈ {f, p}. There is one type of firm that can
be in one of 3 states: vacant, employing a part-time worker, or employing a full-time
worker. Firms can post vacancies v and choose whether to recruit to full-time workers
(af ) or part-time workers (ap = 1 − af ) while paying weakly convex recruiting cost
C(ap, af ). Firms that hire a worker of type i receive output pi and pay wage wi.
Having variable search intensity and recruiting intensity is an important com-
ponent in this model for two primary reasons. First, empirical results show that
workers do not search in the same manner for every type of job nor do they search
in the same manner when employed and unemployed. Workers use different methods
of search as well as choosing different search hours depending on the type of job they
are searching for and their current job status (Holzer (1988), Pissarides & Wadsworth
(1994), Aguiar, Hurst, & Karabarbounis (2013), Faberman et al. (2016)). Thus, it
is important that workers in this model be able to change their search intensity ac-
cording to their current employment status and desired job rather than being stuck
searching with the same intensity across all jobs. Likewise, firms do not recruit for
full-time and part-time positions in the same manner or the same quantity(Russo,
Gorter, & Schettkat (2001)). Likewise, they recruit to workers differently depending
on their current employment status (Faberman et al. (2016)). In Section ??, I show
the importance of this margin. Without the intensive margin of search and recruiting,
the results look dramatically different.
Workers and firms are matched pairwise according to two CRTS matching
functions, one for full-time jobs and one for part-time jobs. The matching function
depends on the effective mass of firms (aiv) and the effective mass of workers (siu).
5The rate at which matches of type i ∈ {f, p} are formed between a firm and worker
is given by
mi(s¯iu, aiv)
where the effective mass of workers depends on average search intensity over all work-
ers s¯i. The probability that any one unit of search intensity results in a job offer is:
µi(θi) = mi(1, θi) =
mi(s¯iu, aiv)
s¯iu
where θi represents market tightness. Given market tightness, an individual worker
who chooses to search with intensity si has individual matching probability
qi(θi, si) = 1−
(
1− µi(θi)
)si
which is the probability that a worker receives at least one job offer resulting from
their search effort. At this point it is worth noting that in equilibrium, s¯i = si since all
workers are homogeneous. This matching probability has some important properties.
First, as an individual worker increases their search intensity si, they increase the
probability that they match with a firm, but all workers are homogeneous, aggregate
search intensity s¯i will increase which results in a lower probability that any one unit
of search intensity produces a job offer such that the individuals matching probability
falls as well resulting in an ambiguous response. Because the measure of workers who
match in a given period is uqi(θi), the probability that a firm’s vacancy is filled is
pi(θi, s¯i) =
qi(θi, s¯i)
θis¯i
6which does not depend on the individual level of search intensity. After a worker and
firm match, they both face some exogenous probability λi that the job is destroyed
which depends on the type of job.
B.2 Equilibrium
At the beginning of each period, workers and firms find out if they matched.
If a worker matches with a part-time firm, they agree with the firm on the part-
time wage. If they match with a full-time firm, they agree with the firm on the
full-time wage. The worker receives the corresponding wage and the firm receives the
corresponding final value of output and pays the corresponding wage. If a worker
remains unemployed, they receive the instantaneous value of leisure and choose their
search intensity and pay some search cost. If a firm remains vacant, they choose their
recruiting intensity and pay some recruiting cost.
B.3 Firm’s Problem
Firms start by posting a vacancy and choosing recruiting intensity ap = 1−af
for part-time jobs and recruiting intensity af for full-time jobs. Firms choose their
recruiting intensity to maximize flow value
V = max
af
{
− C(ap, af ) + βV + βpf (θf , s¯f )[Jf − V ] + βpp(θp, s¯p)[Jp − V ]
}
(B.1)
where they pay recruiting cost C(ap, af ) and match with a part-time worker with
probability pp(θp, s¯p) and with a full-time worker with probability βpf (θf , s¯f ). If they
match with a worker of type i ∈ {f, p}, they receive flow value
Ji = xi − wi + βJi + βλi[V − Ji] (B.2)
7where instantaneous income is the value of output xi and instantaneous cost is wage
wi. They also face some risk that the job is destroyed with probability λi in which
case they choose whether to open a vacancy. Because the goods market is perfectly
competitive, firms will post vacancies until the flow value of posting an additional
vacancy V = 0 in equilibrium.
The choice of recruiting intensity for full-time workers af is given by equation
(??).
∂C
∂af
= β
[∂pf (θf , s¯f )
∂af
(xf − wf (θ, s¯)
αf
)
+
∂pp(θp, s¯p)
∂af
(xp − wp(θ, s¯)
αp
)]
−
[∂wf (θ, s¯)
∂af
(pf (θf , s¯f )
αf
)
+
∂wp(θ, s¯)
∂af
(pp(θp, s¯p)
αp
)]
(B.3)
The LHS denotes the direct cost of increasing recruiting intensity af while the RHS
denotes the indirect gains and costs that increased recruiting has on matching prob-
abilities and wages. First, increased recruiting intensity af increases the full-time
matching probability for a firm while decreasing the part-time matching probability
since ap = 1 − af . In addition, increased recruiting intensity af increases the wage
wf that the firm pays to a full-time worker while decreasing the wage wp that they
pay to a part-time workers.
B.4 Worker’s Problem
Unemployed workers receive some value of leisure z and choose their search
intensity for part-time and full-time employment in order to maximize the flow value
U = max
sf ,sp
{
z
(
1−h(sp+sf )
ν
)
+β
(
U+qf (θf , sf )[Ef−U ]+qp(θp, sp)[Ep−U ]
)}
(B.4)
8where they pay search cost zh(sp + sf )
ν . Their choice of search intensity affects the
probability that they match with a firm for a part-time job with probability qp(θp, sp)
or for a full-time job with probability qf (θf , sf ). If a worker matches with a firm of
type i ∈ {f, p}, they receive flow value
Ei = wi + βEi + βλi[U − Ei] (B.5)
where wage wi is their instantaneous income and they face some risk that the job is
destroyed with probability λi in which case they become unemployed.
The choice of search intensity for employment of type i ∈ {f, p} is given by
(Ωsi + Ωwi)∆1 + Ωqi∆2 = β(Bqi +Bwi)∆1 (B.6)
where the left-hand side of this equation corresponds to the cost of increasing search
intensity si while the right-hand side corresponds to the benefits from increasing
search intensity si. Workers must pay both direct and indirect cost that result from
their choice. First, they pay cost
Ωsi = αfαpzνh(sp + sf )
ν−1
which corresponds to the direct marginal cost of changing their search intensity. The
term αi = 1−β(1−λi) is the discount term for a firm of type i and σ = z
(
1−h(sp+
sf )
ν
)
is the cost of search intensity. Second, any increase in search intensity si will
decrease the wage wi, so the worker pays indirect cost
Ωwi = −βα−iqi(θi, s¯i)
∂wi(θ, s¯)
∂si
9which results from a decrease in market tightness. This is similar to the result from
the canonical DMP model wherein falling market tightness reduces the wage. Both
of these costs are discounted by the discount term ∆1.
∆1 = αfαp + β
∑
i
α−iqi(θi, s¯i)
Finally, The worker pays discounted indirect cost
Ωqi∆2 =
[
βα−i
∂qi(θi, s¯i)
∂si
][
αfαpσ(s) + β
∑
i
α−iqi(θi, s¯i)wi(θ, s¯)
]
which results from an increase in the discount term for the value of being unemployed.
This means that an increase in search intensity si increases qi which increases the
denominator of the flow value of being unemployed U resulting in a decrease in U .
In addition to these costs, an unemployed worker can benefit from increasing search
intensity si as seen on the RHS of equation (??). First, workers get direct benefit
Bqi = α−i
∂qi(θi, s¯i)
∂si
wi(θ, s¯)
which comes from an increase in the probability of matching with a firm resulting
from an increase in search intensity si. Second, workers receive indirect benefit
Bwi = αiq−i(θ−i, s¯−i)
∂w−i(θ, s¯)
∂si
from an increase in the wage for the other type of job −i. As a worker increases search
intensity si holding s−i constant, a higher wage must be paid in order for workers to
be willing to work a job of type −i. Both of these benefits are discounted at rate
β∆1.
10
B.5 Wage Determination
When a worker-firm match is formed, they bargain over the wage which reduces
to the axiomatic Nash Bargaining solution. Workers and firms have full information
about each other and the worker has bargaining power γ while the firm has bargaining
power 1− γ. Thus the wage for a job of type i ∈ {f, p} is determined by
wi = argmax(Ei − U)
γ(Ji − V )
1−γ (B.7)
which yields a system of two equations which can be solved for wages wp and wf as
in equation (??). It is important to note that neither wage can be independently
determined. They depend on each other.
wi =
(
γxi +
(1− γ)αiz(1− h(sp + sf )
ν)
αi + βqi
)
+
(
γx−i +
(1− γ)α−iz(1− h(sp + sf )
ν)
α−i + βq−i
)( (1− γ)βq−i
α−i + βq−i
)
1− (αi + βqi)(α−i + βq−i)
(B.8)
The wage for a job of type i depends not only on the surplus generated from creating
a job of type i, but also on the surplus generated from creating a job of type −i.
Assuming xf > xp implies that as xp increases, both wages wp and wf will increase.
B.6 Steady-State
Definition B.6.1 The steady-state equilibrium consists of a list (u, lf , v, af , wf ,
wp, sf , sp) that solves the unemployment flow equation
mp(s¯pu, apv) +mf (s¯fu, afv) = λf lf + λp(1− u− lf ), (B.9)
the full-time employment flow equation
mf (s¯fu, afv) = λf lf , (B.10)
11
the job creation condition for vacancies
c = βpf (θf , s¯f )
(xf − wf (θ, s¯)
αf
)
+ βpp(θp, s¯p)
(xp − wp(θ, s¯)
αp
)
, (B.11)
the firm’s recruiting intensity maximization equation (??), two wage setting conditions
(??), and the worker’s two search intensity maximization equations (??).
B.7 Numerical Examples
To illustrate how the model works in this simplified environment, I parame-
terize the model and perform some comparative statics assuming a time period of
one month. First, the elasticity of the search cost function is ν = 1, the value of
leisure is z = 1, the cost of recruiting is fixed at c = 0.1xf , and the discount factor is
β = 0.995. For worker’s and firms, the full-time and part-time job destruction rates
are lambdaf = 0.04 and lambdap = 0.08 respectively, the probability of matching
is µi = θi(1 − e
−1/θi), and worker’s bargaining power is γ = 0.5. The final value of
output for full-time workers is xf = 1.6 while the final value of output for part-time
workers follows a Cobb-Douglas production function with a labor-income share of 2/3
so that xp = xf (0.5)
2/3 = 1.01. Finally, the marginal cost of search h = 0.001.
The results shown in Table ?? line up well with the observed data with an
unemployment rate of 7%, a full-time employment rate of 70%, and a part-time
employment rate of 23%. There are a few things that are unusual. First, search effort
for part-time employment is 12 times as large as search effort for full-time employment
which is not empirically consistent with observations that suggest part-time search
effort is lower than full-time search effort. One of the properties of the matching
function is that as vacancies fall, search effort rises. Since firms are only recruiting
for part-time workers with intensity ap = 0.174, workers are induced to search harder
12
Table B.1.: Numerical Elasticities
u lf lp sf sp v af ap wf wp
Baseline 0.071 0.698 0.231 0.183 2.227 0.115 0.826 0.174 1.279 1.186
h 0.002 −0.000 −0.000 −0.008 −0.006 0.007 0.002 −0.008 −0.001 −0.001
z −0.995 0.232 −0.396 5.282 7.433 −2.354 −0.635 3.022 0.369 0.425
λf 0.746 −0.222 0.442 0.562 0.540 −0.015 −0.097 0.462 0.011 −0.004
λp 0.167 0.055 −0.219 0.033 −0.979 −0.125 −0.194 0.922 0.107 0.136
γ 1.628 −0.667 1.517 −2.098 −2.646 −1.260 −0.607 2.888 0.347 −0.065
xf 1.649 0.001 −0.512 −3.274 −2.153 2.461 0.597 −2.838 0.272 0.041
xp −0.421 −0.167 0.636 0.371 −1.737 −0.015 −0.132 0.626 0.377 0.599
for part-time employment than full-time employment. This suggests that separable
cost of search may be needed. Second, the wage for part-time workers is higher than
the final value of output for part-time workers. This is likely due to the high value of
leisure and firms willingness to take a smaller loss from employing a part-time worker
as opposed to continuing to post a vacancy.
Perturbing the model generates some interesting results as well. First, in-
creased marginal cost of search h has a limited effect, but unemployment increases
while both part-time and full-time employment decrease as expected. In addition,
workers search with less intensity since the cost of search is higher. Second, increas-
ing the full-time job destruction rate λf results in increased unemployment, increased
part-time employment, and decreased full-time employment. It also results in in-
creased search effort for both part-time and full-time employment. This result aligns
with Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis (2013) who find that the value of leisure is
lower in bad economic conditions and search intensity is higher. Third, increasing the
part-time job destruction rate λp leads to similar results with increased unemploy-
ment, increased full-time employment and decreased part-time employment. Interest-
ingly, search intensity increases for full-time employment, but decreases for part-time
13
employment. This is likely due to the dominating effect that full-time employment ex-
erts in the model. Finally, if the value of leisure z is increased, the unemployment rate
decreases due to a large increase in search effort. Interestingly, part-time employment
decreases while full-time employment increases even with increased firm recruiting for
part-time workers. I posit that this stems from the higher job destruction rate for
part-time employment compared to full-time employment.
There are some very inconsistent result. First, increasing the full-time final
value of output xf results in higher unemployment even if the full-time employment
rate increases. This is inconsistent with the prior literature and largely stems from a
large decrease in search effort by workers; however, increasing the part-time final value
of output xp results in decreased unemployment and full-time employment, but higher
part-time employment as one would expect. If both are increased proportionally, then
the full-time effect dominates the part-time effect resulting in higher unemployment.
Even though both wages increase, the response from search effort induces a decrease
in unemployment. Scheduling costs, which are analogous to an increase in the final
value of output for a firm, are one interesting theory as to why part-time employment
has risen in recent years. With more efficient scheduling, part-time employment can
become more valuable as it allows firms greater scheduling flexibility. As an example
consider the case of n 160 hour blocks that need to be filled. You could fill each
block with one full-time worker who work 160 hours per month or two part-time
workers who work 80 hours each. This means that an employer has n! ways to fill
these blocks with full-time workers or (2n)! ways with part-time workers. It is fairly
obvious to see that the number of ways a block can be filled with part-time workers
is growing at a much faster rate than for full-time workers which implies that there
may be lower scheduling costs associated with part-time workers and any decrease in
part-time costs could have a disproportionate impact. In the context of the model,
14
a decrease in scheduling costs is associated with a higher final value of output and
higher part-time employment which would be consistent with the scheduling cost
theory.
Without multiple job holdings, the model is fairly consistent with the data
even without calibrating the model. When workers and firms have a choice between
full-time and part-time employment, their search intensity and recruiting intensity
depend not only on the direct and indirect costs and benefits of searching/recruiting
for a given type of job, but also the indirect costs and benefits for the other type of
job. If the two types of jobs are identical in every way, then the problem reduces
to the standard DMP model, so it is relatively tractable. When workers and firms
have the option to hold multiple jobs, their search intensity and recruiting intensity
depend not only on the direct and indirect costs and benefits of searching/recruiting
for a given type of job, but also the indirect costs and benefits for the other type of
job. Even if the two types of jobs are identical in every way, the problem does not
reduce to the standard DMP model unless multiple job holdings is turned off entirely.
One final observation regards the relationship between the unemployment rate
and the full-time rate. As can be seen in Table ??, the unemployment rate u and
the full-time rate lf usually move in opposite directions. A natural question to ask is
under what conditions, the relationship switches as it does when perturbing λp and
xp.
Proposition B.7.1 So long as the following condition holds, the full-time rate will
always move in the opposite direction of the unemployment rate:
λf − λp − u
[(∂qf
∂v
+
∂qp
∂v
) dv
dlf
+
(∂qf
∂af
+
∂qp
∂af
)daf
dlf
+
(∂qf
∂sf
)dsf
dlf
+
(∂qp
∂sp
)dsp
dlf
]
λp + qp + qf + u
(∂qf
∂u
+
∂qp
∂u
) < 0
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The derivation for Proposition ?? is provided in Appendix ??. As soon as the gains to
matching are positive for an increased unemployment rate, the full-time employment
rate and unemployment rate will begin to move in the same direction. This switching
is most obvious for changes in λp for which u and lf begin to move in the same direc-
tion. This becomes apparent again when both search intensities drop and vacancies
rise as it does for a change in xp. This causes the gains from higher unemployment
to increase.
To remedy some of the inconsistencies described above, I consider the case of
multiple job holdings in addition to part-time employment. Multiple job holdings is
particularly relevant when considering part-time employment as part-time workers are
more likely to have multiple jobs and the option of additional employment increases
the flow value of being a part-time worker. For instance, if being a full-time worker
becomes more valuable, then fewer workers will be employed part-time, but with
multiple job holdings, the value of being a part-time worker also increases as they have
the option of working a secondary full-time job. This mutes dampens the response
of part-time employment. Finally, I consider the case of separable search cost with
the cost of search being allowed to vary depending on the type of job a worker is
searching for.
B.8 Uniqueness
Given that workers can hold more than one job and firms can recruit more than
one type of worker, it is not clear that there will be a unique solution. Consider the
job creation curve and wage setting curve that relate how the vacancy rate and wage
are related. Since there are two wages, the wage setting curve could be non-monotonic
or upward sloping which would result in more than one equilibrium.
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Proposition B.8.1 If the following conditions hold, then there exist a unique triplet
(v,w1,w2) for the vacancy rate and both wages such that there exist a unique steady-
state equilibrium for the above problem.
q2 <
1
β
(B.12)
α1α2C(a1)
[
α2
∂p1
∂v
+ βλ1
∂p2
∂v
]
> x
[
βλ1(λ1p2 − βλ1p2)− p1α1α2
]∂p2
∂v
+ x
[
p2α1α2
]∂p1
∂v
− w2
[
p2βλ1α1
]∂p2
∂v
+ w2α1
[
p1α2 + βλ1p2 + p2α2
]∂p1
∂v
(B.13)
α1C(a1)
∂p2
∂v
> β(x− w1)
(
p2
∂p1
∂v
− p1
∂p2
∂v
)
(B.14)
0 < β
[(1− γ)βλ1(w1 + σ2 − σ1)
(1− β + βλ1 + βq1)2
]∂q1
∂v
(B.15)
The proof for this proposition is given below. Essentially, it must be shown that
the wage setting curves cross the job creation curve at only one point regardless of
whether the two curves are both upward sloping. It is not enough to show that the
two curves are monotonically moving in opposite directions since the two curves are
allowed to do so given the other wage and recruiting intensity. As such, a continuum
of solutions can also be ruled out.
Proof Given w2, (??) can be plugged into (??) to form a single equation in terms
of v. Similarly, given w1, (??) can be plugged into (??) to form another equation in
terms of v. Since the job creation condition is set equal to zero, it follows that
f(v) = h(v) + g(v) = 0
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is an implicit function defined in terms of v. In order for a unique solution to exist,
there must be a unique optimum that satisfies:
f ′(v) = h′(v) + g′(v) = 0
As long as h′(v) = −g′(v), a unique optimum exist.
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C. Derivation of Proposition ??
Proof Fully differentiating the unemployment flow equation, we get:
du(qf + qp + λp) = (λf − λ− p)dlf − u
(∂qf
∂u
du+
∂qf
∂v
dv +
∂qf
∂af
daf +
∂qf
∂sf
dsf
)
− u
(∂qp
∂u
du+
∂qp
∂v
dv +
∂qp
∂af
daf +
∂qp
∂sp
dsp
)
which can be rearranged as
du
dlf
=
λf − λp − u
[(∂qf
∂v
+
∂qp
∂v
) dv
dlf
+
(∂qf
∂af
+
∂qp
∂af
)daf
dlf
+
(∂qf
∂sf
)dsf
dlf
+
(∂qp
∂sp
)dsp
dlf
]
λp + qp + qf + u
(∂qf
∂u
+
∂qp
∂u
)
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D. Tables and Figures
(a) U Rate (b) FT Rate (c) PT Rate
Figure D.1.: Employment Rates
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Table D.1.: Descriptive Statistics – Non-Recession*
Employment Percent Millions Flow
Percent
Millions Hazard
Status of Population of Persons Into of Persons Rate
U 7.6 7.4


FT 20.5 1.5 1.6
PT 9.1 0.7 2.4
U 70.4 5.2 0.4
FT 70.7 64.2


PT 5.7 3.7 2.9
FT / PT 0.9 0.6 4.7
U 2.3 1.5 3.8
FT 91.1 58.4 0.1
PT 16.0 14.8


FT 25.5 3.8 1.4
FT / PT 0.9 0.1 4.7
Dual PT 0.6 0.1 5.1
U 4.6 0.7 3.1
PT 68.4 10.1 0.4
FT / PT 4.7 4.3


FT 19.1 0.8 1.7
PT 3.7 0.2 3.3
FT / PT 77.2 3.3 0.3
Dual PT 0.8 0.7
{
PT 15.6 0.1 1.9
Dual PT 84.4 0.6 0.2
*Average calculated using HP-filtered monthly CPS data from December 2001 to December 2004
Table D.2.: Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Parameter 2001-2004∗ 2015-2016∗ New Target
b 0.9668 0.9568 asv/u = 0.88
c 0.3418 0.6130 Total cost of recruiting = 0.3203
hf 0.0432 0.0464


quf = 0.1773
hp 0.0040 0.0053 qup = 0.0873
Hf 7784.1 8067.5 qfp = 0.0073
Hp 1346.5 1348.9 qpf = 0.0066
C 0.2929 0.2022 qpp = 0.0054
∗ Time periods correspond to Dec. 2001 - Dec. 2004 and Jan. 2015 - Dec. 2016.
